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Abstract
This paper studies majority voting over the size and location of a public good when voters
di¤er both in income and in their preferences for the public good location. Public good
provision is nanced either by a lump sum tax or by a proportional income tax. We ana-
lyze both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations of the public goods size and
location. We show that, while the choice of the type of public good follows the traditional
median logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation rate need not coincide with the
preferences of a median income citizen.
With lump sum nancing, income heterogeneity plays no role and the sequential equi-
librium consists of the median location together with the public good level most-preferred
by the individual located at the median distance from the median. This policy bundle also
constitutes an equilibrium with simultaneous voting in the special case of a uniform bivari-
ate distribution of individuals income and location. With proportional taxation, there is
no policy equilibrium with simultaneous voting. We o¤er a complete characterization of the
equations describing the sequential equilibrium in the general case and we show why and
how our results depart from those obtained with the lump sum case. The public good level
is lower than the one emerging under lump sum taxation when the income distribution is
concave and when the correlation between individualsincome and location is positive but
not perfect.
Keywords: proportional income taxation, bidimensional policy and trait spaces.
JEL Codes: D72, H41
1 Introduction
Our main objective in this paper is to contribute to the analysis of majority voting over
public good provision when both the policy space and the space of voterstraits are multidi-
mensional. Models of democratic public good provision are of interest by themselves, since
they shed light on the determinants of the size and type of public goods o¤ered in democ-
racies. Such models are also at the center of the emerging literature on nation formation,
whose main objective is to understand the determinants of the number, size and stability of
nations. Although our paper does not attempt to introduce such considerations, surveying
this literature allows us to take stock of how public good provision under majority voting
has been analyzed and to improve upon the models developed.
Contributions to this literature di¤er according to several dimensions. First, they ei-
ther deal with the case where the policy choice is horizontal (with citizens selecting the
location of their capital or the proportion of a xed budget to be allocated to a specic
public good), vertical (with citizens typically choosing the quantity of a public good), or
where both the horizontal and vertical components are voted upon. Second, the citizens
may be heterogeneous in their preferences for the public good, in their income, or in both.
Papers di¤er also in whether the distribution of the source of heterogeneity (income and/or
preferences) is restricted to be uniform, or whether more general distribution functions are
considered. Finally, they di¤er in how the public good is to be nanced: by a lump sum tax
or by a proportional income tax. Table 1 summarizes how articles di¤er according to these
dimensions.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Our paper generalizes the existing literature by incorporating simultaneously the follow-
ing characteristics: we study the determination by majority voting of both the (horizontal)
type and (vertical) size of a public good, when voters di¤er both in income and in their
preferences for the type (i.e., location) of good provided. The distribution of voterstraits is
given by a generic bivariate distribution function (i.e., we go beyond the uniform distribution
case). We also study both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations of the type
and size of the public good.
We now explain why the generalizations we propose are relevant and how the results
we obtain qualify and extend those obtained in the literature. Decisions regarding the type
and size of the public good to be provided are obviously closely linked and would be better
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understood with a simultaneous voting model. Unfortunately, moving to more than one
dimension leads to a discontinuous leap in complexity, as it is well known that simultaneous
majority voting on multidimensional policy spaces generically has no equilibrium.1 Our
rst objective is to clarify under which circumstances (i.e., characteristics of the bivariate
distribution of individual traits) a majority voting (or Condorcet) equilibrium exists when
voting simultaneously over the type and size of the public good. The answer to this question
depends on the type of public good nancing considered: lump sum or with a proportional
income tax. In the rst case, we obtain that a majority voting equilibrium exists only if
the distribution of preferences in the economy is median uniform. This condition, which we
precisely dene, is very stringent (although satised by the uniform distribution) and non
generic. In the case of proportional income taxation, a majority voting equilibrium never
exists.
These results explain why the few papers (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999), referred
to as ABE hereafter, Etro (2006), Gregorini (2009), Perroni and Scharf (2001))2 studying
both public good dimensions assume that majority voting is sequential. At rst glance, a
sequential mechanism looks safe from the point of view of existence as soon as preferences
are regular enough (in particular, single-peaked on each dimension) since each vote is uni-
dimensional. Note however that, unless its is assumed that the two components are totally
separable, the backward resolution will lead to a reduced utility function in the rst stage
which need not be single-peaked. In order to circumvent this di¢ culty, existing papers make
additional assumptions. First, they all consider an ordering of the votes (rst on size, then
on type) which guarantees the existence of an equilibrium: ABE recognizes for instance that
this assumption is made for tractability, in order to avoid issues of multidimensional voting,
which is not our focus.Second, most papers restrict themselves to lump sum taxation. In
our paper with income and preference heterogeneity, lump sum nancing results in the me-
dian location being chosen together with the size most-preferred by the individual with the
median distance to the median agent. This is the same result as the one obtained by ABE,
Perroni and Scharf (2001) and Etro (2006), which all consider that agents do not di¤er in
income. This shows that introducing income heterogeneity has no impact on the results in
the presence of lump sum taxation.
We then study the nancing of the public good through proportional income taxation.
Such an assumption is much closer to practice than lump sum nancing. Observe that
1More precisely, the set of regular (in particular convex) preference proles with a majority equilibrium
in multidimensional policy spaces is generically empty (Banks and Austen-Smith (1999)).
2See also Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby (2004).
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citizensincome does matter in such a context, as people varying in income favor di¤erent
quantities of public good even if they have the same preference for its location. Also, as people
di¤er in two dimensions, we describe the polity by a two-dimensional statistical distribution
that need not be uniform on any dimension.3 Assuming uniformity is indeed a very special
case and makes it di¢ cult for the reader to assess which results (such as the features of the
equilibrium policy) may be generalized to other distributions. Also, assuming uniformity
eliminates the possibility of discussing the impact of some societal characteristics like for
instance polarization (Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2005)) or correlation between taste
and income on the policy outcome.
We show that, while the choice of the type of public good follows the traditional median
logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation rate is more subtle and need not co-
incide with the preferences of a citizen with a median trait. More precisely, the sequential
equilibrium identied by ABE in a lump sum setting (median location together with public
good amount favored by the individual with the median distance to the median location
and the median income level) carries through to the case of proportional taxation if (i) the
distributions of income and of location are independent from each other, (ii) the location
distribution is uniform, and (iii) the income distribution is symmetrical. If only the rst
two assumptions are satised, then the size of the public good is smaller (resp., larger) than
the level identied by ABE if the income distribution is everywhere concave (resp., convex).
For instance, if income follows a Beta distribution that is positively skewed (as in all OECD
countries), then the equilibrium public good level is lower than the one identied by ABE.
As for the correlation between income and location preferences, we investigate numerically
the case where both distributions are uniform. We obtain that the ABE rule corresponds to
the case where they are either perfectly correlated or independent from each other. In the
case where both traits are positively but imperfectly correlated, the equilibrium public good
level is lower than the one identied by ABE.4
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the
case where the public good is nanced by lump sum taxation while section 4 is devoted to the
nancing with proportional income taxation. In both sections, we start with the simultaneous
voting game before analyzing the sequential voting game. Section 5 compares the equilibrium
3We follow the same approach as the one adopted by Le Breton and Weber (2003) in the traditional
unidimensional model.
4It is di¢ cult to compare our results with the two other papers studying proportional taxation. Bolton
and Roland (1997) assume that people di¤er only in income and vote over the size of the public good. They
obtain the classical result that the voter with the median income is decisive. Gregorini (2009) introduces
heterogeneity in both preferences and income but only considers two income groups. Moreover, he assumes
that the public good amount is determined by a social planner rather than by majority voting.
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allocation with sequential voting and proportional taxation with the allocation obtained by
ABE. We also show in this section how our equilibrium allocation is impacted by the shape
of the income distribution and by its correlation with the location distribution.
We now turn to the setting of our model.
2 The Model
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of citizens of unitary mass. This economy
has to select a public policy consisting of two components : a horizontal component, which is
described as a continuous variable in the interval [0; 1], and a vertical component described
as a continuous variable in <+. While the model can accommodate several alternative
interpretations, it is useful to think of the public policy as a decision on both the type p
of a pure public good, facility or service to produce (the horizontal dimension) and on the
quantity or size g of this particular public good (the vertical dimension). A nice illustration
is the case where the horizontal dimension is simply the location of the public good.
Citizens are heterogeneous in two dimensions. First, they di¤er according to their pref-
erences for the di¤erent types of public goods. In that respect, each citizen is described by
a parameter  in [0; 1]. Second, each citizen is described by his/her private income y in the
interval5 [0; y]. The statistical distribution of types across citizens is described by a joint
distribution F on [0; 1] [0; y] which is assumed to be absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure on <2. We will denote by f its density and by F and Fy the marginal
of F on [0; 1] and [0; y], respectively.
The payo¤ of an individual of type (; y) when the policy (p; g) is selected is equal to
V (g) [  j  pj] + y   t(y)
where V 0 > 0; V 00 < 0; V (0)  0 and where   1 is a parameter and t(y) denotes the tax paid
by such a citizen. Therefore, the parameter  represents the most-preferred type of public
good by a citizen with type , irrespective of his/her income. Note also that preferences are
quasi-linear with respect to income which is implicitly assumed to be equivalent to private
consumption.6 We focus on the case where the tax is an a¢ ne function of income i.e.,
t(y) = ay + b;
5This is without loss of generality since we can set y = +1; for instance to consider popular income
distributions such as the Pareto and Beta distributions.
6Most contributions in the nation formation literature consider a quasi-linear setting.
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where a 2 [0; 1] and b 2 0;b. The technology used to produce the public good in quantity g
is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale irrespective of the type of public good which
is selected i.e., up to a normalization, g units of numeraire are needed to produce g units
of public good. However, the linear part of the tax system is distortionary. We follow the
existing literature (see e.g. Bolton and Roland (1997)) by assuming that there is a small
quadratic cost that decreases each individuals tax proceeds by  a
2
2
y where  is a positive
parameter.7 The government budget constraint is then given by
g =
Z 1
0
d
Z y
0

t(y)  a
2
2
y

f(; y)dy
= b+ (a  a
2
2
)yM (1)
where
yM 
Z 1
0
d
Z y
0
yf(; y)dy
is the average income in the economy.
Combining all these elements, we deduce that the (indirect) utility of a citizen of type
(; y) for the policy (p; a; b) is
V (b+ (a  a
2
2
)yM) [  j  pj] + (1  a) y   b:
We restrict ourselves to two categories of tax functions belonging to the a¢ ne family:
pure lump sum taxation (b > 0; a = 0) and pure proportional taxation (b = 0; a > 0).8
We start with the simpler case, lump sum taxation, which is the one used in the literature
(see Etro (2006), ABE, Perroni and Scharf (2001)). We then move to proportional taxation,
where additional e¤ects crop up. In both cases, we rst assume that individuals vote simul-
taneously over the type and the size of the public good. We show that the conditions (on
the distribution of traits) to have an equilibrium (a Condorcet winning policy pair i.e., a
policy pair that is preferred by a majority of voters to any other feasible policy pair) are very
restrictive. We next introduce a sequential way to choose the two policies, assuming that
people vote rst over the tax policy and then over the type of public good. This sequence
of votes seems reasonable and is indeed the one most often studied in the literature.9 We
7We could have assumed, as in Etro (2006) for instance, that the distortion also a¤ects the lump sum
part of the tax function. This would not have a¤ected our qualitative results. The assumption that lump
sum taxes do not generate distortions seems more natural to us.
8We leave the analysis of the (simultaneous or sequential) determination of the more general 3-parameter
(a, b and p) model for future research.
9ABE motivate the order of this sequence by arguing that it resembles common budget procedures in
which the size of the budget is decided before its composition.
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identify the equilibrium policy pair under this sequence of votes, and we study how it is
a¤ected by the bivariate distribution of voterstraits.
3 Lump sum taxation
In this section, we consider the case analyzed by ABE, Etro (2006) and Gregorini (2009)
where t(y) = b i.e., a tax which is the same for all citizens. The (indirect) utility of a
citizen of type (; y) for the policy (p; b) is10
U(p; b) = V (b) [  j  pj] + y   b: (2)
We see immediately that the individuals income plays no role in determining his prefer-
ences for either b or p. Obviously, individualsmost-preferred policy position p corresponds
to their own position . As for their most-preferred lump sum tax b, conditional on p = ,
it is given by the following rst-order condition
V 0(b) = 1;
and is thus the same for all individuals. Figure 1 illustrates the preference upper contour
sets of four individuals, when V (b) =
p
b and  = 3=2: Comparing the top left panel with the
two bottom ones (where individuals di¤er in income but share the same position ) conrms
that the upper contour sets are not a¤ected by the individuals income level. Comparing
the two top panels allows to see the impact of modifying the individuals position  on his
preferences.
Insert Figure 1 around here
We rst study the simultaneous determination of p and b.
3.1 Simultaneous vote over both policy dimensions
Our objective in this section is to assess under which circumstances (i.e., distributions of
individualstraits) a Condorcet winning pair (p; b) exists when voting simultaneously over p
and b. We proceed as follows. Whenever the (indirect) utility functions of the citizens are
strictly quasi-concave, an alternative (p; b) is a Condorcet winner if and only if there exists a
10We assume that individuals have enough income or (unmodelled) wealth to pay any lump sum transfer
lower than or equal to b.
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neighborhood centered on (p; b) which does not contain an alternative defeating (p; b) i.e.,
(p; b) is a Condorcet winner if and only if (p; b) is a local or di¤erential Condorcet winner
(Banks and Austen-Smith (1999)). We show in Appendix 1 that a su¢ cient condition for the
indirect preferences to be quasi concave is that V is concave enough and/or  is large enough.
In this section, we assume that the indirect utility functions are strictly quasi-concave.
We rst characterize the set of voters who would favor a policy change in the generic
direction d to some given policy bundle. By looking at a specic direction, we show that
any equilibrium policy must entail the provision of the public good with the median most-
preferred location. Using this information, we characterize the tax component of the equilib-
rium policy as well. Finally, by looking at all possible deviations, we show that the conditions
that the bivariate distribution of characteristic F must satisfy for a Condorcet winner to exist
are very restrictive, and satised mainly by the uniform distribution.
Starting from a generic policy bundle (p; b), the individuals who (weakly) favor a deviation
in the direction d are such that
d;

@U(p; b)
@p
;
@U(p; b)
@b

 0;
where h:; :i denotes the scalar product and where11
@U(p; b)
@b
= V 0(b) [  j  pj]  1;
@U(p; b)
@p
= V (b) if  > p;
=  V (b) if  < p;
= 0 if  = p:
If we denote by dp the horizontal component of the vector d, and by db its vertical
component, we obtain that the set of individuals favoring the direction d (starting from
(p; b)) is given by12
f(; y) such that  > p and dpV (b) + db [V 0(b) [  + p]  1]  0g
[ f(; y) such that  < p and   dpV (b) + db [V 0(b) [  p+ ]  1]  0g :
11Strictly speaking, the function U is not di¤erentiable with respect to p when p = , but since p = 
corresponds to the peak of the function, we set its derivative equal to zero. Not having to deal explicitly
with the non-di¤erentiability at one point allows us to simplify a lot the exposition of the results, without
of course a¤ecting them.
12The assumption that F is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure guarantees that
the set of individuals with  = med has zero measure. To simplify notation and save space, we restrict
ourselves to the description of sets with strictly positive measure.
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If we take a direction such that dp > 0 and db = 0 (i.e., an increase in p without
modication of b), we obtain the straightforward result that all individuals with  < p
oppose this move while all those with  > p favor this move. We then obtain that, to be
immune to deviations in this direction, the starting pair must be such that p = med, with
med the unique solution of the equation
F(x) =
1
2
:
In words, any public good location di¤erent from the median most-preferred one in the
population would be defeated by a proposal moving this location closer to the median.
>From now on, we assume that p = med as initial location and we focus on the tax
component of the policy bundle. If we consider a deviation d such that db > 0, we obtain
that the set of individuals (weakly) favoring this deviation from (med; b) is given by
(; y) such that  > med and   med + + dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)
  1
V 0(b)

[

(; y) such that  < med and   med   + dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)
+
1
V 0(b)

: (3)
It is convenient to denote by  the variable  j  medj. Loosely speaking, this variable
measures how much an individual located at  values a public good of type med. Note that
 varies in the interval [; ] where     Max (med; 1  med). Formally, let H denote
the joint distribution of (; y) in [; ] [0; y] and let H and Hy be the corresponding two
marginal distributions. We have
H(x) = F(x  + med) + [1  F (+ med   x)]
leading to the rst marginal density
h(x) = f (x  + med) + f(+ med   x):
We can now express (3) in a more concise way:
(; y) such that  > med and   1
V 0(b)
  dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)

[

(; y) such that  < med and   1
V 0(b)
+
dpV (b)
dbV 0(b)

:
If dp = 0 and db > 0, we obtain that the individuals who favor the direction d are
characterized by
  1
V 0(b)
: (4)
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It is easy to interpret this inequality. Observe from (2) that the utility of individual (; y)
when p = med is
U(med; b) = V (b) + y   b:
The rst-order condition for b is then given by
V 0 (b)  1 = 0:
Condition (4) then means that all individuals whose most-preferred lump sum tax is larger
than b support a move in any direction d that increases b with p constant (dp = 0; db > 0).
By contrast, individuals whose most-preferred lump sum tax is strictly lower than b would
support a move in the opposite direction,  d. For a majority of voters to prefer b to a move
in either direction d or  d, we must have
medV
0(b) = 1
, b = V 0 1( 1
med
);
where med is the median value of :
H (
) =
1
2
:
We have thus proved the following:
Proposition 1 Assume that t(y) = b and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
b. Then, if a Condorcet winning pair (p; b) exists, p = med and b is the most-preferred lump
sum tax of the individuals with the median distance to the median .
It is interesting to note that the most-preferred lump sum tax of the median individual
(such that  = med, or  = ) is not part of the Condorcet winning policy pair. Indeed,
it is easy to see that voters (other than med) unanimously support a decrease in taxation
from the policy (med, V 0
 1
( 1

)). The reason for this is intuitive: since p = med, the median
individual med obtains exactly the kind of public good he most prefers. He is then the
individual whose marginal valuation of the public good is the largest in the polity. In other
words, if this voter has his say on the lump sum tax, everyone would like to decrease this
tax because they all value the public good less (at the margin) than him.
We now turn to the conditions under which the policy pair (med; V 0
 1
( 1
med
)) is a Con-
dorcet winner. A rst necessary condition is that, whatever dp and for any db > 0, the set
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of people who (weakly) favor a move in the direction d has a measure at most equal to one
half. This set of individuals is given by (3) where we replace b by V 0
 1
( 1
med
) to obtain
f(; y) such that  > med and   1(dp; db)g
[ f(; y) such that  < med and   2(dp; db)g ; (5)
where
1(dp; db) = Max

med + (  med) + med
dp
db
V (V 0
 1
(
1
med
)); med

;
2(dp; db) = Min

med   (  med) + med
dp
db
V (V 0
 1
(
1
med
)); med

:
The rst necessary condition is then that the measure of this set equals at most one half:
F(1(dp; db))  F(2(dp; db)) 
1
2
: (6)
To shed some light on this condition, we rst assume that dp = 0. In that case, condition
(6) simplies to
F(1(0; db))  F(2(0; db)) 
1
2
;
where
1(0; db) = med + (  med) > med;
2(0; db) = med   (  med) < med:
In that case, the set of voters who prefer the direction d (i.e., an increase in b without
change in the location) is given by an interval of people centered on the individual with the
median most-preferred location. Recall that people close to the median location have the
highest willingness to pay for this kind of good it is thus no surprise that an interval of
people around that median prefer a higher value of b. The fact that this interval is exactly
centered on med crucially depends on the assumption that dp = 0: in that case, people
equidistant from med have exactly the same preference for an increase in b.
If we rather consider that dp > 0 (together with db > 0), the interval of people who prefer
an increase in b moves to the right: distance from med is not the only thing that matters
anymore, since people to the right of med benet from dp > 0 while people to the left of
med dislike this component of d. As dp becomes large compared to db, 2(dp; db) becomes
larger than med and the only people favoring such a move have a larger-than-average value
of . Similarly, if we consider dp < 0 (together with db > 0), the interval of people who
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favor direction d shifts to the left, and as dp=db becomes su¢ ciently large (in absolute value),
1(dp; db) becomes smaller than med and only people with lower-than-average values of 
are in favor of direction d.
When db < 0; the set of people who (weakly) favor a move in the direction d is given by
f(; y) such that  > med and   1(dp; db)g
[ f(; y) such that  < med and   2(dp; db)g ; (7)
which is the complement to set (5). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for (p; b) to be a
Condorcet winning pair is then that both sets (5) and (7) have a measure at most equal to
one half, with translates to
F(1(dp; db))  F(2(dp; db)) =
1
2
: (8)
By denition of med, condition (8) is satised when dp = 0. On the other hand, this
measure will generically move away from one half as dp is increased (for any constant db),
except in very special circumstances. Note that condition (8) can be reformulated as
F(med + bd+ d)  F(med   bd+ d) = 1
2
for all d 2
i
 bd; bdi ; (9)
where F(med) = 12 and
bd is such that F(med + bd)   F (med   bd) = 12 . When d = bd,
this implies F(med + 2bd)   F(med) = 12 and therefore F(med + 2bd) = 1. Similarly,
when d =  bd, this implies F(med) F(med  2bd)) = 12 and therefore F(med + 2bd) = 0.
Hereafter, the distributions satisfying (9) are called median uniform. We have then proved:
Proposition 2 Assume that t(y) = b and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
b. A Condorcet winning pair (p; b) exists only if the distribution of  is median uniform.
The uniform distribution is of course median uniform, but there are other examples.
Take for instance any function h on

1
4
; 3
4

such that h(t) = h(1   t) for all t 2 1
4
; 1
2

andR 1
2
1
4
h(t)dt = 1
4
. Let f be the function dened on [0; 1] as
f() =
8<:
h(1
2
  t) for all t 2 0; 1
4

h(t) for all t 2 1
4
; 3
4

h(3
2
  t) for all t 2 3
4
; 1

It is straightforward to check that f is the density of a median uniform distribution.
Despite some exibility, it should however be clear that median uniformity is not generic 
i.e., the condition is violated for some small perturbations of any median uniform distribution.
Since a Condorcet winning pair (p; b) generically does not exist, we consider in the next
section a sequential determination of the two policy dimensions.
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3.2 Sequential vote
In this section, we proceed as in ABE and consider a sequential majority procedure where
citizens vote rst on the lump sum tax b and then on the type p. It is immediate to see
from (2) that there is a majority equilibrium in the second stage which is independent of the
decision on b in the rst stage. This majority equilibrium corresponds to the median value
med of .
Solving backward, in the rst stage the individuals anticipate the value of p that will be
chosen in the second stage and vote according to their utility function (2) where we make
use of p = med and of the denition of  to obtain
U(med; b) = V (b) + y   b:
This utility function is concave in b, and individual s most-preferred value of b (given
that  = med), which we denote by b(), is the solution to
V 0(b)  1 = 0
in the case of an interior solution. We have that
b() = 0 if V 0(0) < 1 i.e., if  is low enough and
b() = b if V 0(b) > 1 i.e., if  is large enough.
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain that
@b()
@
=   V
0(b)
V 00(b)
=
1
A(b)
> 0; (10)
where A(b) is the absolute risk aversion coe¢ cient (describing the shape of the utility func-
tion). The sensitivity of the most-preferred tax of an individual to his distance to the median
type decreases with risk aversion.
Figure 2 illustrates the iso-tax lines in the (; y) space. They are vertical, since the
income dimension does not play any role here.
Insert Figure 2 around here
Applying the usual median voter theorem, we obtain that the result of the vote is b =
b(med) i.e., the lump sum tax most-preferred by the individuals located at the median
distance from the median, which is the rule derived by ABE. Note that, in stark contrast
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with the preceding section, a sequential equilibrium always exists, whatever the distribution
F .
We have obtained the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that t(y) = b and that individuals vote sequentially, rst over the
lump sum tax b and then over the public good type p. The unique equilibrium of this voting
procedure is given by p = med and b = b(med) i.e., the chosen type is the median one,
while the lump sum tax is the one most-favored by the individuals with the median distance
from the median on the location dimension.
Corollary 1 The Condorcet winning pair (p; b) obtained with simultaneous voting over p
and b, if it exists, is identical to the equilibrium of the sequential voting game where b is
chosen rst and p second.
When the public good is nanced with a lump sum transfer, the income heterogeneity
among individuals plays absolutely no role. We now turn to the richer case where propor-
tional income taxes are used.
4 Proportional income taxation
In the case of a proportional income tax t(y) = ay, the (indirect) utility of a citizen of type
(; y) for the policy (p; a) is
W (p; a) = V (g(a)) [  j  pj] + (1  a) y; (11)
where g(a) is given by the government budget constraint (1) when b = 0: We proceed as
in the previous section: we rst show that there is in general no Condorcet winner when
individuals vote simultaneously over p and a. We then study the sequential game where
individuals vote rst over a and then over p. We provide in Appendix 2 the proof that
indirect utilities are quasi-concave with proportional income taxation if V is concave enough
and/or  is large enough. We then assume quasi-concavity of indirect utility preferences in
this section.
4.1 Simultaneous vote over p and a
We start by looking at the optimal policy (p(; y); a(; y)) of a citizen of type (; y).
Clearly, p(; y) = : whatever the size of the public good, the individual would like its
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favored type to be provided. We then obtain that a(; y) is solution to the following rst-
order condition
V 0(g(a)) (1  a) = y
yM
: (12)
It is immediate to see from (12) that the most-preferred tax rate of an individual now
depends on his income, in sharp contrast with the lump sum nancing case. Figure 3
depicts the preference upper contour sets of four individuals when V (b) =
p
b and  = 3=2:
Unsurprisingly, the most-preferred tax rate is decreasing with the individuals income, since
taxes owed increase with income.
Insert Figure 3 around here
We proceed as in the previous section, starting from a generic policy bundle (p; a) and
looking for necessary conditions that its components have to satisfy in order for the pair to
be a Condorcet winner. Starting from (p; a), the individuals who favor a deviation in the
direction d are such that 
d;

@W (p; a)
@p
;
@W (p; a)
@a

 0;
where
@W (p; a)
@a
= V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM [  j  pj]  y;
@W (p; a)
@p
= V (g(a)) if  > p;
=  V (g(a)) if  < p;
= 0 if  = p:
We denote as previously by dp the horizontal component of the vector d, and by da its
vertical component. The set of individuals favoring the direction d (starting from (p; a)) is
given by
f(; y) such that  > p and dpV (b) + da [V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM [  + p]  y]  0g
[ f(; y) such that  < p and   dpV (b) + da [V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM [  p+ ]  y]  0g :
We use the same argument as in the preceding section to show that a Condorcet winning
policy pair must involve p = med: if it were not the case, a majority of voters would like to
deviate in the direction of the median  while keeping the tax rate a constant.
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>From now on, we assume that p = med and focus on the tax component of the policy
bundle. If we consider a deviation d such that da > 0, we obtain that the set of individuals
favoring this deviation from (med; a) is given by
(; y) such that  > med and y  V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM + dp
da
V (g(a))

(13)
[

(; y) such that  < med and y  V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM   dp
da
V (g(a))

:
If dp = 0, we obtain that all individuals who (weakly) favor the direction d (an increase
in b while keeping p constant) are such that
y  V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM : (14)
Observe that the rst-order condition for an individual (; y) faced with p = med is given
by
y = V 0(g (a)) (1  a) yM : (15)
To illustrate the joint e¤ect of y and  on the optimal choice, we denote by ~y(; a) the
income level that satises (15) i.e., the income of an individual of type  who most prefers
a proportional tax rate of a when faced with p = med. Condition (14) shows that all
individuals who have an income lower than ~y are in favor of an increase in a (i.e., da > 0).
Figure 4 (a) illustrates condition (14) in the (; y) space. Assume that we start with the
value of a that is most-preferred by the individual with the median income and the median
location, so that ~y(; a) = ymed. Among individuals located at med, those who favor an
increase in a are those whose income is lower than the median income in the population.
Individuals located further from med on the horizontal axis have a lower marginal valuation
of the public good. As the benet from this good decreases with the distance between
individual location  and median location, so does the threshold value of income below
which voters favor an increase in the tax rate. To satisfy the optimal behavior described by
(15),  and y must be comonotonic (in other words, they must change in the same direction).
Insert Figure 4 around here
One immediately infers from this gure that the policy bundle composed of med and of
the most-preferred tax rate of the individual with both the median location and the median
income is always defeated by a majority of voters who prefer a lower tax rate (and the
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same location). The intuition is similar to the one exposed in the lump sum case, and is
based upon the observation that individuals with the median location are those who have
the largest direct benets from the public good. Consequently, a move to decrease the tax
rate from their most-preferred level is favored not only by all individuals with above-median
income, but also by poorer-than-median individuals who are located far enough from the
median location. This holds true whatever the distribution function F or H.
Let us denote by (med; a) the policy pair that is such that exactly one half of the polity is
in favor of an increase in the tax rate when the location of the public good is kept unchanged.
It is clear from above that this policy is the most-preferred one of an individual with median
location and with a larger-than-median income: ~y(; a) > ymed. For instance, in the case
where the distributions of locations and of income are both uniform (and independent), the
tax rate a is given by Z 

V 0(g(a))
(1  a)
   yMd = 1=2:
Making use of the rst-order condition of the individual ~y(; a), we obtain that
~y(; a) =

+ 
=

2  1
2
;
i.e. that ~y(; a) > ymed as explained above.
It is interesting to note that, in the case of the uniform and independent distributions
of  and y, the tax rate a is also the most-preferred tax of an individual with the average
income yM and with the median distance to the median location, med: ~y(med; a
) = yM .
To prove this, it is enough to observe that the rst-order condition for an individual with
 =  and y = ~y(; a);
V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM = 
2  1
2
;
is the same as the rst-order condition for individual with  = med and y = yM
  1
4

V 0(g(a))(1  a)yM = yM :
We summarize our results so far in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
a. Then, if a Condorcet winning pair (p; a) exists, it is such that p = med and that a is the
most-preferred proportional tax of individuals with median location and with a larger-than-
median income. In the special case of uniform and independent distributions of  and y, this
policy a is also the one most-preferred by an individual with the average income yM and the
median distance to the median location, med.
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We now look at the set of people who prefer an increase in taxation coupled with an
increase in the location of the public good (i.e., a move dp > 0 and da > 0), starting from
(med; a). This set is dened in (13) and is represented on Figure 4 (b). The threshold
income below which individuals favor a move in the direction d remains decreasing in the
distance between individuals location and policy location, as in Figure 4 (a), but we now
observe a discontinuity for  = med = p. To the left of med, individuals do not favor an
increase in p as it moves the location of the public good further away from their bliss point,
while to the right of med individuals do favor such a move. The size of the discontinuity
increases with dp, the horizontal component of the move considered (for a given da). More
precisely, as dp increases the threshold income level decreases by V (g(a))=da to the left of
med and increases by the same amount V (g(a))=da to the right of med.
The conclusion we draw from Figure 4 is that the existence of a Condorcet winning
policy pair when voting simultaneously over the two dimensions is extremely unlikely. Even
if we start from a policy pair (med; a) such that exactly one half of the polity would like
to increase the tax rate while keeping the location constant, when we consider directions
where both dimensions are modied simultaneously, Figure 4 (b) shows that the bivariate
distribution of  and y must exhibit a lot of symmetry for the policy pair to remain immune
to these deviations. Moreover, even in the case of the uniform independent distributions,
there is no Condorcet winner. This can be seen from the fact that the income distribution
is bounded above and that ~y(; a) > yM . This last observation means that, if dp is large
enough, then the threshold income of an individual who is located immediately to the right
of med reaches the upper bound of the distribution. As is shown on Figure 4 (c), we obtain
in that case that a majority of voters favor a decrease in p coupled with a decrease in the
tax rate. We then obtain
Proposition 5 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote simultaneously over p and
a. There is no Condorcet winning pair (p; a), even in the case of uniform and independent
distributions of  and y.
We now turn to the sequential determination of both policy dimensions.
4.2 Sequential vote
In what follows, we consider a sequential majority procedure where citizens vote rst on the
tax rate a and then on the type p. We see immediately from (11) that there is a majority
equilibrium in the second stage which is independent of the decision on a in the rst stage.
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This majority equilibrium, which we denote by p2, corresponds to the median value of :
p2 = med:
Solving backward, citizens are aware that their choice of a has no inuence at all on the
result of the second stage vote. Their most-preferred value of a, denoted by ~a(; y), is then
obtained as a solution to the following rst-order condition
V 0(g(a)) (1  a) = y
yM
: (16)
This rst-order condition is su¢ cient since the second derivative of the indirect utility func-
tion
V 00(g(a)) (1  a)2   V 0(g(a))
is negative. If
V 0 (0) yM   y  0; then ~a(; y) = 0
and if
V 0((1  
2
)yM) (1  ) yM   y  0, then ~a(; y) = 1:
From the implicit function theorem and the second order conditions, we deduce immedi-
ately that, if ~a(; y) is an interior solution, then
@~a(; y)
@
=   V
0(g(a)) (1  a) yM
V 00(g(a)) (1  a)2   V 0(g(a)) > 0; (17)
and
@~a(; y)
@y
=
1
V 00(g(a)) (1  a)2   V 0(g(a)) < 0: (18)
Not surprisingly, citizens endowed with a large income or distant from the median type of
public good have a low most-preferred proportional tax rate. It is easy to see from (17) that
the sensitivity of the most-preferred tax rate to the distance from the median type is inversely
related to the absolute coe¢ cient of risk aversion. Risk aversion mitigates the e¤ect of the
individualscharacteristics on their tax choices and this also guarantees a further degree of
freedom for the model.13
Figure 5 depicts the iso-tax curves in the type space [; ] [0; y] i.e., the locus of types
(; y) whose most-preferred tax policy is a.
13In the sense that even if we assume a high , meaning that people have similar preferences for location,
we can mitigate this e¤ect by selecting an appropriate utility function. See also (10).
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Insert Figure 5 around here
From (17) and (18), we deduce that the slope dy=d of an iso-tax curve corresponding
to a = ~a(; y) is equal to
V 0(g(a)) (1  a) yM ;
which does not depend on  nor on y i.e., the iso-tax curves are a¢ ne functions. In order to
nd the equilibrium tax rate emerging from the rst stage vote, we have to nd the median
iso-tax line i.e. the iso-tax line that separates the set of types into two halves, with one
half located above the line (and favoring a smaller tax rate) and the other half located below
(and supporting a lower tax rate).14 Formally, the equilibrium rst stage tax rate, which we
denote by a1, is the solution to
	(a) =
Z 

d
Z '(a)
0
h(; y)dy =
1
2
; (19)
where
'(a)  yMV 0(g(a)) (1  a) :
Proposition 6 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote rst over a and then over
p. The equilibrium policy pair is composed of the median policy location med together with
the proportional rate a1 as dened in equation (19).
In the next section, we compare the sequential equilibrium (p2; a1) with a natural bench-
mark, and we assess the role played by the bivariate distribution of voterstypes.
5 Comparison with benchmark
The equilibrium policy pair when individuals vote rst over the proportional tax rate and
then over the type of public good results in the median policy location to be proposed,
together with a proportional tax rate a1. This proportional tax rate is given by formula (19),
which is not very transparent. In this section, we would like to investigate the determinants of
this formula, and particularly how it is a¤ected by the properties of the bivariate distribution
functionH(; y). In order to do this, we rst dene a natural benchmark for the proportional
tax rate. This benchmark, which we denote by amed, is dened as the most-preferred tax
14Given the continuity of F with respect to the Lebesgue measure, the set of individuals located exactly
on the median iso-line has zero measure.
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rate of citizens with a median income ymed and a median distance to the median, med. It is
the solution to the equation
V 0(g(a)) (1  a) = ymed
medyM
where med and ymed are dened as
H(med) =
1
2
and Hy(ymed) =
1
2
:
This benchmark is attractive because it corresponds to the equilibrium obtained in ABE.15
It also corresponds to the equilibrium obtained with a sequential vote over a lump sum tax
rst and then over the type of public good (see Proposition 3).
We rst study the circumstances under which a1 and amed di¤er when the distributions
of income and of location are independent from each other. We then lift this assumption in
order to try and understand the role played by the correlation between types.
5.1 Independent distributions
The simplest case we examine (which is also the one most of the literature has focused on,
such as in Etro (2006), Gregorini (2009) and Perroni and Scharf (2001)) assumes that the
bivariate distribution H is uniform (this is of course a -very- special case of independent
distributions H and Hy). Formula (19) then simplies to
	(a1) =
1
y (  )' (a1)
Z 

d =
+ 
2y
' (a1) =
1
2
;
which implies that
' (a1) =
y
(+ )
;
i.e.,
V 0(g(a1)) (1  a1) = y
yM (+ )
:
By contrast, the most-preferred tax rate of an individual of type
 
+
2
; ymed

when p =
med is solution to the equation
V 0(g(amed)) (1  amed) = ymed
medyM
: (20)
It is straightforward to see that amed = a1 since ymed = y=2 and med = (+ )=2:
15In ABE, votersincome plays no role as the public good is nanced with a lump sum transfer. In our
extension to proportional taxation, income does play a role so we choose the natural benchmark of the
median income voter.
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Proposition 7 Assume that t(y) = ay and that individuals vote rst over p and then over
a. If the bivariate distribution of types is uniform, then the equilibrium proportional tax
rate is the tax rate most-preferred by the individual with the median income and the median
distance to the median when faced with p = med.
We then turn to the more general case where the two types are independent but not both
uniformly distributed:
Assumption 1: h(; y) = h()hy(y)
Under Assumption 1, amed is solution to the equationZ 

h()Hy(' (a1))d =
1
2
: (21)
First note that, if instead of being continuous, as assumed here, H was concentrated16 on
a unique value  , then the above equation would simplify to
H(' (a1)) =
1
2
, ' (a1) = ymed

;
from which, together with (19) and the denition of ' (a), we conclude that a1 = amed.
Rather than assuming a concentrated distributionH, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: H() is the uniform distribution over [; ].
In that case,17 a1 solves Z 

Hy(' (a))d =
  
2
(22)
while amed is such that
Hy(
+ 
2
' (amed)) =
1
2
:
The two tax rates do not coincide in general. It is of interest to identify the properties of
Hy which would lead to a1 being smaller than, equal to, or larger than the benchmark amed.
We have that, if Hy is concave (respectively, convex), thenZ 

Hy(' (a))d  (respectively,  ) Hy(+ 
2
' (a)):
Since
'0(a)  y2MV 00(g(a)) (1  a)2   yMV 0(g(a)) < 0;
and Hy is increasing, we deduce from above that
16A so-called Dirac mass.
17which results from the uniformity of the distribution F of .
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Proposition 8 Assume that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, (a) If Hy is concave then
Hy(
+
2
' (a1))  12 and therefore amed  a1; (b) If Hy is convex then Hy(+2 ' (a1))  12
and therefore amed  a1;(c) If Hy is linear (i.e., the income distribution is uniform), then
amed = a1:
The case where Hy has concave and convex sections is also important as reected by the
standard assumption of single-peaked density. We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 3: hy is symmetrical around yM = y=2.
In that case, amed is given by
+ 
2
' (amed) =
y
2
= yM :
Replacing a by amed in (22), and using the symmetry of Hy, we obtainZ 

Hy(

M
yM)d =
Z +
2

Hy(

M
yM)d +
Z +
2


1 Hy( 
M
yM)

d
=
Z +
2

d =
  
2
;
i.e., we have proved
Proposition 9 Assume that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, the equilibrium proportional tax
rate is the tax rate most-preferred by the individual with the median income and the median
distance to the median (when faced with p = med) : amed = a1:
Observe that Proposition 7 is a special case of Proposition 9. Propositions 8 and 9 have
not exhausted the set of possible (and interesting) distributions of income. We now provide
numerical illustrations of the di¤erence between a1 and amed when H is uniform while Hy
is a Beta distribution. Figure 6 (a) shows amed and a1 as functions of the skewness of the
income distribution for the family of Beta distributions with linear frequencies (i.e., when
either the rst or the second parameter of the distribution is equal to 1). A skewness of zero
corresponds to the uniform distribution (Beta(1,1)), for which, according to Proposition 8,
amed = a1. We see from Figure 6 (a) that, when the skewness is negative, we have that
a1 > amed while the opposite relationship occurs with a positive skewness. This result is
indeed a special case of Proposition 8, since a negatively skewed linear hy generates a convex
Hy, while a positively skewed linear hy generates a concave Hy. From the gure, we also
obtain that the gap between amed and a1 is increasing in skewness, even though a1 is not
monotone in skewness (it rst decreases, then increases in skewness).
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Insert Figure 6 around here
Figure 6 (b) performs the same exercise for another family of Beta income distribution
functions, namely those with single-peaked and non-linear frequencies.18 We obtain the same
qualitative results as in panel (a): a1 > amed when skewness is negative, a1 < amed when
skewness is positive, and the gap between amed and a1 is monotone increasing in skewness.
Observe that the fact that a1 = amed when the skewness is nil is an illustration of Proposition
9, since the Beta distribution studied is symmetrical around one half.
We know that empirical distributions of income are positively skewed. Figure 6 (b) then
suggests that generalizing indiscriminately the median distance to the median result of
ABE to the real world leads to an over-estimation of the equilibrium proportional tax rate.
In the next section, we go beyond Assumption 1 and study the impact of the correlation
between income and location.
5.2 Correlation between income and location
When the two marginal distributions are correlated, the picture becomes more complex. To
assess the intrinsic role of independence, it is useful to introduce a measure of departure
from independence. From Sklars theorem (Sklar (1959)), there exists a joint distribution C
on [0; 1]2, called a copula, such that its two marginals are uniform on [0; 1] and
H(; y) = C(H () ; Hy (y)):
As an illustration, we now assume that both H and Hy are uniformly distributed, and
that the distribution H is obtained using the Archimedean copula
H(; y) =  1((H ()) + (Hy (y)));
where  is called the generator function. We provide an example with the so-called Gumbel
copula, where the generator function is given by
(x) = (ln(x)) c :
Increasing c results in an increase in the correlation between  and y: the correlation is
equal to zero (independence) when c = 0, and increases to one as c becomes large enough.
18More precisely, we study Beta(c; d) distributions where one parameter is equal to 2. Negatively skewed
distributions correspond to c > 2 and d = 2 while positive skewness corresponds to c = 2 and d > 2. The
case with zero skewness corresponds to Beta(2,2).
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Figure 7 shows both amed and a1 as functions of the correlation between  and y when the
Gumbel copula is used and H and Hy are uniform. We already know from Proposition 8
that amed = a1 when the distributions H and Hy are uniform and independent. Figure 7
shows that amed = a1 also when the correlation between income and position is perfect; a
simple look at Figure 5 should convince the reader that this is so, since the median iso-tax
line remains the same in both the cases of perfect correlation and of independence. We
further learn from Figure 7 that amed > a1 when the correlation is strictly in between zero
and one. This means that generalizing without discrimination the median distance to the
medianresult from ABE to a setting like the one depicted in Figure 7 leads to over-estimate
the equilibrium proportional tax rate.
Insert Figure 7 around here
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study majority voting over the size and location of a public good. Individ-
uals di¤er both in income and in their preferences for the public good location, so that the
polity is summarized by a bivariate distribution of these two traits. Public expenditures are
nanced by a¢ ne income taxation: we consider both the case of a lump sum tax and of a
proportional income tax. We study both the simultaneous and the sequential determinations
of the public good size and location. We show that, while the choice of the type of public
good follows the traditional median logic, the majoritarian determination of the taxation
rate is more subtle and need not coincide with the preferences of a median income citizen.
With lump sum nancing, income heterogeneity plays no role and the sequential equilibrium
consists of the median location together with the public good level most-preferred by the
individual located at the median distance to the median (as in ABE). This policy bundle
also constitutes an equilibrium with simultaneous voting in the special case of a median
uniform bivariate distribution. With proportional taxation, there is no policy equilibrium
with simultaneous voting even if the bivariate distribution is uniform. We o¤er a complete
characterization of the equations describing the sequential equilibrium in the general case (no
assumption on the bivariate distribution of traits). We show why and how our results depart
from those obtained by ABE, where the public good level chosen is the one most-preferred by
the individual with the median distance to the median and the median income. We obtain a
lower public good level than this benchmark when the income distribution is concave, such
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as with positively skewed Beta distributions, and when the correlation between income and
location is positive but not perfect.
This paper is a rst step towards a more general analysis of the majoritarian decision
process when the policy set is multidimensional. Further research would shed additional light
on the robustness of the conclusions established in the present paper. First, we would like to
know to which extent these results remain valid for a broader class of settings and of utility
functions. Is the quasi-linear form an inescapable constraint? The specic utility functions
used in this paper are common in the nation formation literature which has motivated us,
but we conjecture that some features of the equilibrium outcome can be extended to more
general formulations. A second promising direction of research would consist in comparing
the equilibrium reached under sequential voting with another popular solution due to Kramer
(1972) and Shepsle (1979), in which separate committees vote on the various issues at hand.
De Donder, Le Breton and Peluso (2009) contain some preliminary answers to these two
questions. A third direction of research would consist in integrating the majority voting
approach described in this paper to a more general game of nation formation.
7 Appendix
In the two following subsections, we investigate the conditions under which the indirect
utility functions of the citizens in the lump sum case and in the proportional case are strictly
quasi- concave. The developments are based on a straightforward application of the classical
di¤erential test of strict quasi-concavity as exposed for instance in Green, Mas-Colell and
Whinston (1995)).
7.1 Appendix 1
In this rst appendix, we demonstrate that, under some appropriate conditions, the (indirect)
utility U of a citizen of type (; y) in the case of lump sum taxation
U(p; b) = V (b) [  j  pj] + y   b
is strictly quasi-concave. Without loss of generality, consider the case where  > p. The
bordered Hessian matrix D2U(p; b) attached to U is here0@ V 00(b)(  + p) V 0(b) V 0(b)(  + p)  1V 0(b) 0 V (b)
V 0(b)(  + p)  1 V (b) 0
1A
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The utility function is strictly quasi-concave if and only if the determinant of this matrix
is positive i.e., if
2 (V 0(b)(  + p)  1)V (b)V 0(b)  (V (b))2 V 00(b)(  + p) > 0;
which is equivalent to the inequality
2 (V 0(b))2   V (b)V 00(b) > 2V
0(b)
  + p:
The right hand side is decreasing in p. Therefore, it is enough to check this inequality
for p = 0 i.e.,
2 (V 0(b))2   V (b)V 00(b)
2V 0(b)
>
1
  :
The relevant (i.e., Pareto) range of values of b is the interval

V 0 1
 
1
 1

; V 0 1
 
1


. The
above inequality is tighter to satisfy when  = 1 and V 0(b) is small. Therefore, it will hold
true for all b 2 V 0 1   1
 1

; V 0 1
 
1


and all  2 [0; 1] if
1

  V (b)V
00(b)
2V 0(b)
>
1
  1 ;
i.e. if
 V (b)V
00(b)
2V 0(b)
>
1
 (  1) ;
which holds true when V is concave enough or/and  is large enough. For the sake of
illustration, consider the isoelastic case19 V (b) = b with  2 ]0; 1[. The above condition
simplies to
(1  )
2
b 1 >
1
 (  1) :
Since b 1  1

, the inequality will hold true if
(1  )
2
>
1
  1 ;
or equivalently if
 <
  1
+ 1
:
19In the isoelastic case , the su¢ cient condition can be improved to the condition (1+)2 >

 1 or even to
the condition (1+)2 >

  if we dont look for a condition uniform with respect to .
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7.2 Appendix 2
In this second appendix, we prove that under appropriate conditions, the (indirect) utility
W of a citizen of type (; y) in the case of proportional taxation,20
W (p; a) = V (ayM)) [  j  pj] + (1  a) y;
is strictly quasi-concave. Without loss of generality, we consider the case where  > p. The
bordered Hessian matrix D2W (p; a) attached to W is here0@ V 00(ayM) (yM)2 (  + p) V 0(ayM)yM V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  yV 0(ayM)yM 0 V (ayM)
V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  y V (ayM) 0
1A
The utility function is strictly quasi-concave if and only if the determinant of this matrix
is positive i.e., if
2 (V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  y)V (ayM)V 0(ayM)yM (V (ayM))2 V 00(ayM) (yM)2 ( +p) > 0;
which is equivalent to
2 (V 0(ayM)yM(  + p)  y)V 0(ayM)  V (ayM)V 00(ayM)yM(  + p) > 0;
and, after some rearrangements, to
yM
h
2 (V 0(ayM))
2   V (ayM)V 00(ayM)
i
>
2V 0(ayM)y
  + p :
As in Appendix 1, the right hand side is decreasing in p. Therefore, it is enough to check
this inequality for p = 0 i.e. that
yM
y
2 (V 0(ayM))
2   V (ayM)V 00(ayM)
2V 0(ayM)
>
1
  ;
or equivalently that
yM
y
V 0(ayM)  yM
y
V (ayM)V
00(ayM)
2V 0(ayM)
>
1
  :
The relevant range of values of ayM is the interval
h
V 0 1

y
( 1)yM

; V 0 1

y
yM
i
. The
above inequality is tighter to satisfy when  = 1 and V 0(ayM) is small. Therefore, it will
hold true for all ayM 2
h
V 0 1

y
( 1)yM

; V 0 1

y
yM
i
and all  2 [0; 1] if
 yM
y
V (ayM)V
00(ayM)
2V 0(ayM)
>
1
 (  1) ;
20We assume that  = 0 in order to simplify the already complex calculations, but this assumption is
without loss of generality.
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which, as in the lump sum case, holds true when V is concave enough or/and  is large
enough. In the isoelastic case V (ayM) = (ayM) with  2 ]0; 1[, and since (ayM) 1yM 
y
yM
1

, the inequality will hold true if
(1  )
2
>
1
  1 ;
as in appendix 1.
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Table 1: Survey of the nation formation literature
Public good’s choice Voters’ heterogeneity Uniform Taxation
Horizontal Vertical Both Preferences Income Both Distribution Lump sum Proportional
of traits
Alesina Spolaore (1997) X X X X
Le Breton Weber (2003) X X X
Bolton Roland (1997) X X X
Jehiel Scotchmer (1997) X X X X
Jehiel Scotchmer (2001) X X X X
Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) X X X
Alesina, Baquir and Hoxby (2004) X X1 X X
Perroni Scharf (2001) X X X X
Etro (2006) X X X X
Gregorini (2009) X X X X
Figure 1 : Preference contour sets in Hp, bL space with lump sum taxation
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Figure 2: Iso-tax curves with lump-sum taxation
Figure 3 : Preference contour sets in Hp, aL space with proportional taxation
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Figure 5: Iso-tax curves with proportional taxation
Figure 6 : amed and a1 as a function of skewness for Beta distributions
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Figure 7 : Gumbel copula with Hβ and Hy uniform
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